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The way in which taxes affect savings behaviour has
attracted much recent attention both theoretically and
empirically. Developments in the theory of optimal
taxation and econometric studies of the role of interest rates
in the consumption function have stimulated thinking in this
area, and both are highly relevant to issues currently at
the centre of policy debate about tax reform. 'In 1978 the
Meade Committee published a lengthy and detailed Report
analysing the failures of the British tax system, and
recommended that it be converted gradually into a personal
expenditure tax. (Meade Committee 1978).
One of the most instructive features of the Report was
that it did not rely on the traditional arguments for an
expenditure tax (that expenditure is a more just tax base than
income, and that an expenditure tax avoids the efficiency
losses associated with the double taxation of savings implied
by an income tax), but instead based its case on more practical
grounds. The present tax system is neither an income tax nor
an expenditure tax, and its problems stem from this hybrid
nature. The real case for an expenditure tax, so the argument
runR, is that an expenditure tax would be much simpler to
operate than a pure income tax, and indeed that the latter would-2-
be almost infeasible(for a detailed examination of these
arguments the reader is referred to Meade Committee (1978)
and Kay and King(1978))., Similar propositions have been put
forward in the US by the report of the US Treasury (1977) and
in Sweden by Lodin (1978).
Although the Meade Committee's Report does not contain
an evaluation of the efficiency arguments, it does not reject
these as potentially insignificant; rather, the compelling
arguments for a change lie elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is
clearly important to assess the efficiency gains or losses
which might be involved in any major reform. In this paper we
shall try to explore, in the context of a very simple model,
the efficiency arguments for and against an expenditure tax,
and to assess some recent claims that the welfare gains from
abolishing capital income taxes would be very large.
In section 1 we examine the optimal taxation of capital
and labour incomes in a simple growth model and derive formulae
for the optimal tax rates. These are used in section 2 to
evaluate claims that abolishing capital income taxes would
lead to large welfare gains. Inflation is introduced in
section 3, and alternative approaches to modelling savings
behaviour are discussed in Section 4. Finally, we look briefly
at some of the empirical evidence on the effects of taxes on
savings.
Our analysis will be highly simplified. We shall ignore
many of the issues stressed by the Meade Committee, such as the
complex interaction between personal and corporate taxation, the-3-
sheer diversity of tax rates currently imposed on different
forms of saving, and the portfolio aspects of personal saving.
The relationship between expenditure on durab1es and saving
and the effect of social security on consumption will also be
left to one side. We shall say little about the production
side of the economy, and for surveys of the effects of taxes
on investment the reader is referred to He11iwe11 (1976),
King (1977), and von Furstenberg and Ma1kie1 (1977).
Despite these omissions the model captures the essential
features necessary to an evaluation of the efficiency arguments.-4-
1. The Optimal Taxation of Savings
The optimum taxation of savings, or equivalently,
capital income, has long been the subject of debate by
economists in terms of the choice of the tax base. Both a
comprehensive income tax, in which capital income is taxed
at the same rate as labour income, and an expenditur~ tax,
in which capital income is not taxed at all, have fervent
supporters and even more fervent opponents. With the
development of the theory of optimal indirect taxation, it
is natural to apply the results of these theoretical
investigations to the problem of intertemporal choice.
Ramsey's (1927) classic paper on optimal commodity
taxes did discuss this question, and he concluded that capital
income should be taxed at lower rates than labour income but
should not be exempt from tax altogether. But only very
recently have economists tackled this question in more detail
and at this early stage it is perhaps not surprising that
"the subject remains clouded in confusion" (Feldstein, 1978 a)
Before examining a formal model we may relate the question to
two traditional arguments often deployed in favour of an
expenditure tax as opposed to an income tax.
A frequent argument in favour of an expenditure tax is
that it is more "just" to tax someone on the value of what he
takes out of society in terms of the goods and services he-5-
consumes, than on the value of what he contributes to society,
whether in the form of wage income in return for labour
services or capital income in return for the supply of capital
services. It is common to cite the quotation of Hobbes
popularised by Kaldor,
"What reason is there, that he which laboureth much
and sparing the fruit of his labour, consumeth little, should
be more charged, than he that liveth idly, getteth little,
and spendeth all he gets: seeing the one hath no more
protection from the commonwealth than the other?" (Hobbes,
1651)
Unfortunately this quotation from Hobbes seems to
have been misunderstood by many. First, there is simply
no obvious reason for believing that a tax on actual
consumption is more just than a tax on potential consumption.
Is it just to treat a disabled beggar and a wealthy miser in
the same way? Secondly, Hobbes' example is misleading.
The reason for the unfairness is that one individual enjoys
a good deal of leisure ('liveth idly" while his neighbour
"laboureth much") and this is not reflected in his tax pay-
ments. But this has nothing to do with the distinction
between income and consumption. Under an expenditure tax,
the man who had worked hard, saved, and wanted to spend his
money at some point in the future would face a heavy tax
liability. Both an income tax and an expenditure tax fail
to tax leisure and so provide a disincentive to work effort.
Unless we believe that lump-sum taxes are feasible there is-6-
nothing we can do about this. In assessing the economic
effect of alternative systems of taxing capital income we
must not overlook the efficiency loss involved in the
distortion of the work-leisure choice.
Another traditional argument often used to advance the
cause of an expenditure tax is that an income tax is
inefficient because it gives rise to the "double taxation of
savings". With an expenditure tax the rate of tax on
consumption is (for a given rate schedule) the same regard-
less of the year in which the individual chooses to consume.
An income tax, on the other hand, reduces the rate of return
on personal savings below the market rate of interest. This
produces an efficiency loss because, so the argument runs,
the market rate of interest is equal to the rate of return on
investment and hence the income tax places a wedge between
the intertemporal rates of substitution in consumption and
transformation in production.
But the market rate of interest may not be equal to the
rate of return on investment, and one of the principal causes
of a divergence here is the corporate tax system. The
effects of the corporate tax system on the cost of capital
are important to an evaluation of the efficiency loss
resulting from an income tax, and it is possible to design
a corporate tax system which largely offsets the effects of
income tax (fora detailed discussion of this, see King (1977)
chapter 8). In this paper, however, we shall assume that the
pre-tax rate of interest equals the marginal product of capital.
;-7-
Even if an income tax did produce substantial
intertemporal inefficiency, standard "second-best" arguments
suggest that this is not an overwhelming argument for an
expenditure tax. The "optimal" tax on income from savings
will take into account both intertemporal inefficiency and
also the static welfare loss arising from the distortion of
the work-leisure choice by both income and expenditure taxes
which was discussed above.
To explore this issue formally we shall begin by
considering a simple two-period model similar to that
analysed by Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965), and, in the
context of taxes, by Atkinson and Sandmo (1979) ,and Auerbach (1978) (1) We
shall make the following assumptions
1) Each individual lives for two periods. They work in
period 1, supplying L units of labour (the length of the
period is normalised to unity), and retire in period 2.
They consume in both periods and all individuals within
a generation are identical (thus we ignore the problem
of distribution within a generation). Preferences are
described by the direct utility function.
(1)
where C. is per capita consumption in the i th period of
J.
life.
2) There are no bequests and saving in period 1 is solely
to provide consumption in period 2. The taxation of-8-
bequests is discussed further in the paper by Atkinson
in this volume.
3) In any given period two overlapping ge~ations are alive.
There is a constant growth rate of population n and so
the younger generation is larger than the elder by a
fraction I + n. There is no technical progress, and
there is steady-state growth at the rate n.
4) Output is given by the following constant returns to
scale production function, and for convenience we
assume that capital does not depreciate.
Y = L N f (k)
where k is capital per man-hour, N is the number of
workers, and Y is total output p
As far as the tax system is concerned, we shall assume
that lump-sum taxes are infeasible and that the government
imposes' 'pr'o'p'ortional taxes on labour and capital incomes at
at the rates t and t respectively. Of course, some lump- w r
sum taxation is feasible but we shall suppose that there is
a limit to the amount which can be raised by this means,
and the government's revenue requirement may therefore be
regarded in what follows as net of lump-sum taxes. To
simplify the analysis we shall also ignore non linear tax
schedules,
If we denote the pre-tax values of the wage rate by




= w(l - t ) w
(3)
where the price of second-period consumption is defined by
1
1 + (1 - t ) r r
The term on the right-hand side of (3) is exogenous income,
sometimes known as "full" income.
The first-order conditions for an individual maximising
(1) subject to (3) are (where U. denotes the partial
J.
derivative of U with respect to argument i)
(4)
= h




The solution to equations (3), (5) and (6) describes
individual behaviour as a function of factor prices and the
tax rates imposed by government.
The steady-state level of capital per head is given
by the equilibrium condition that planned investment equals
planned savings. Net investment equals the savings of
the generation at work minus the dissavings of the retired
(which equals the existing capital stock because the retired
ileave no bequests). Hence
-10-




(l + n) k L = (8)
We shall assume that the government wishes to raise a
fixed amount of revenue each period equal to an amount g
per worker. The government's budget constraint is given by
g = t wL + w (9 )
The government chooses values of the two tax rates to
maximise its objective function subject to the constraints
implied by (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9). There are two
aspects to this decision. The first 'is that relative tax
burdens imposed on wage and interest income will reflect the
need to balance the distortions in individual work-leisure and
present-future consumption choices. Equations (5) and (6)
show how the tax rates introduce a wedge between factor
prices and rates of substitution. This is the standard
efficiency argument underlying the theory of optimal taxation.
But there is a second aspect to the government's decision
problem which arises from the dynamic nature of the model,
and which has profound implications for the analysis of the
welfare effects of capital income taxation. From equation-11-
(8) we can see that one of the effects of taxation is to
influence the equilibrium level of capital per man-hour.
This determines the path of consumption over time.
Individuals in our model are concerned only with their own
consumption, and ignore future generations. In contrast,
we shall assume that the government takes a view about
intergenerationalequity. As yet we have not specified the
government's objective function, and the precise form we
adopt will determine the optimal path of consumption over
time. A natural specification in a steady-state framework
is that the government maximises the steady-state level of
utility. The level of capital intensity which maximises
this objective function is given by the well-known "golden
rule" condition that the marginal product of capital equals
the growth rate.
f' (k) = n (10)
If the government has no policy instruments other than
the two tax rates then in general' it will be unable to
achieve the golden rule condition, and the optimal tax rates
will reflect the trade-off between not only the conventional
efficiency losses but also between these and the losses
reSUlting from the failure to achieve the dynamic optimality
condition (10). We shall see below that the optimal tax
rate on capital income is very sensitive to this second factor.
This is rather disturbing because it alerts us to the
/-12-
pO$sibility that our conclusions are sensitive to the
assumptions we make about poliqy instruments which are
excluded from the model. ~or example, if the government
could use debt policy to determine the rate of interest in
the economy, it could attain the golden rule and the. optimal
tax rates would be independent of dynamic considerations.
Clearly, the welfare implications of particular tax
changes (such as the replacement of the income tax by a
consumption ~ax) depend upon the constraints which are, or
are not, assumed to restrict the use of other policy
instruments. Although this is a standard "second-best"
argument, it is very important to note that one of the
principal sources of disagreement over the potential
welfare gains from tax reform is not differing assumptions
about the behavioural responses to taxes, but the assumptions
(often implicit) made about other policy instruments. We
shall see examples of this below.
It will obviously be interesting to solve the general
problem in which the only policy instruments available to
government are the two tax rates, and in which tax-induced
changes in capital intensity are taken into account. But
we shall begin by tackling the much simpler problem in
which the level of capital per man-hour is taken as a
parameter (perhaps because the government can manipulate its
level by other policies) and fixed exogenously at k = k.
This determines the levels of the wage and interest rates which,
in a perfectly .competitive economy, are
;w = f(k) - k f' (k)
r = f' (k)




rates to maximise the steady-state of utility subject to (a)
individual optimising behaviour, and (b) its own budget
constraint, taking the values of w, rand k as parameters
of the problem. One reason for exploring this problem first
is that we may exploit the properties of its solution to
solve the more complicated problem in a rather simple manner.
Partly for this purpose, and partly for reasons of elegance,
we shall find it easier to work with the indirect utility
function which corresponds to (1), and which we may denote
by (normalising such that the price of first-period
t " " "t )2 consump lon lS unl y
V(h, w(l - t ), y) w
where y is exogenous income.
(13)
A well-known property of indirect utility functions (see,




(14)1 - L = [=> L =
-14-
(15)
where V. is the partial derivative of V w.r.t. i th argument.
1.
We may form the Lagrangean
hr t r C2 y) + Arg - t w wL -
1 + n
(16)
The first order conditions (with respect to t and t ) w r
3 are














rh C2 +. (l T rh t r )] (18)
1 + n
The first of these equations allows for the fact that exogenous




aL rh t aC2 rh C2 + rh t J rh2 C
2
r
at + at + (l
. r r 1 + n r 1 + n =
wL
[WL + W
aL rh t aC2l
t +
r
w at 1 + n atw J w
The derivatives of c2 and L with respect to the tax
rates indicate the responses of savings and labour supply to
(19)
taxation. In the appendix it is shown that if we use the
Slutsky equations, and define the compensated elasticities as-15-
O. 0' (i.e. 0 .. is the percentage change in the demand for
~J ~J
i for a one per cent compensated change in the price of j),




(-022 + °L2) =




This equation explains the relative tax burdens imposed on
wage and interest income. The absolute value of the tax
rates will depend also on the size of the government's
revenue requirement.
In the special case when the government can use policies
such as debt finance to attain the golden rule with r = n,
the optimal "second-best" tax rates are given by
(21)
In this case, dynamic considerations disappear and the
optimal tax rates reflect only the compensated demand
elasticities of leisure and future consumption. If we
restrict ourselves for the moment to an examinati.on of (21),
is there any presumption for an expenditure tax rather than
an income tax on efficiency grounds? An expenditure tax
(which corresponds to t = 0) will be the optimal tax r
system if and only if4
/-16-
(22)
This result was first proved, in a different context, by
Corlett and Hague (1953).
It is possible to show (after some manipulation of
equations (AI) to (AB» that for (22) to hold then more
generally
(23)
This equation says that the necessary condition for an
expenditure tax to be optimal is that a compensated change
in the wage rate leads to equal proportionate changes in
first-period consumption, in second-period consumption, and
in labour supply. This requires that the ratio of
consumption in the two periods is independent of the wage
rate. Although this may appear a not implausible
specification of preferences, there is no a priori reason
for adopting it and little empirical evidence to enable us
to test the hypothesis. Indeed, equation (22) should warn us
that if we are to· use empirical evidence to assess the
optimality of an expenditure tax, we must be very careful not
to assume (implicitly) the truth of (22) but to allow the
data to choose whether or not to reject the hypothesis that
the utility function satisfies (22). Unfortunately, many
common specifications of the individual utility function
imply (22) and so cannot be used to provide independent
i-17-
evidence about the value of the relevant elasticities.
Consider for example, the Cobb-Douglas indirect utility
function
a l a 2 h x
V =
Y
where x = w(l - t ) w
The Cobb-Douglas
(24)
form lies behind much empirical work
on the life cycle hypothesis and the aggregate consumption
function because it implies that current consumption is a
constant fraction of lifetime income.
From (3), (14) and (15) the demand functions are
Cl







L = 1 - (27)
x
It is clear from these equatiohs that the Cobb-Douglas
specification implies a number of special properties. First,
consumption in period 1 is a constant fraction of the value
of the consumer's endowment. Secondly, savings are a
constant fraction of the value of the consumer's endowment
(from (26)) and hence, in this model, are independent of the
interest rate. Finally, the assumption that the endowment
consists of potential labour supply"in the first period means-18-
that actual labour supply will be constant and independent of
factor prices.
Inverting the equations (AI) to (A4), and solving for
the values of the compensated demand elasticities we have
(noting that in this model a change in x implies an equal
change in y)
=a-I 1 (28)




aLL = a2 (31)
In this case it is clear that an expenditure tax is
optimal. It is equally clear that empirical investigations
into the value of the elasticities based upon the assumption
of a Cobb-Douglas utility function (or any other function
satisfying (22» would provide no evidence on the question.
We shall discuss the empirical evidence on savings and
taxation below, but we may note that the values of the optimal
tax rates depend upon the cross-elasticities of saving with
respect to the wage rate and labour supply with respect to the
interest rate. Typically, empirical studies ignore these
elasticities. Suppose the cross-elasticities are zero,
then (we are still in the golden rule world)
/-19-
1 + n t aLL
t = w (32)
r 1 t n - 0 22 w
Typical values of the own price-elasticities are
aLL = 0.4, 0 22 = -1.2, and we may take the growth rate over








If the tax rate on labour income is one-third (to meet
the revenue requirements), the value of the tax on capital
income is also one-third, and a comprehensive income tax
is optimal. The choice between alternative tax bases is
very sensitive to estimates of the relevant elasticities,
and equally "plausible" values for the parameters have very
different implications for tax policy.
It is not difficult to imagine econometric studies
producing point estimates which could be used to justify
either an expenditure tax or a comprehensive income tax.
A few more examples will illustrate the point. Let us
retain the assumption that the cross-elasticities are
zero and that the tax rate on labour income is one-third.
If the value of 0 22 is only -0.8 instead of -1.2 then the
optimal capital income tax rate is 50 per cent. But if
0 22 remains at -1.2 and the estimate of aLL is revised
downwards to 0.2, the capital income tax rate is only one-
/-20-
sixth, exactly one-half the tax rate on labour income. If
we now relax the assumption that the cross-elasticities are
zero and take 0L2 = -0.3, and 02L = 0.25, and hold 0LL and
022 at their original values,the optimal tax rate on capital
income turns out to be 10 per cent. A value of 02L greater
than 0LL would imply that capital income should be subsidised.
All of which goes to show that to base policy recommendations
on econometric estimates of the elasticities one must be
confident that the standard errors of the estimates are small.
Equation (21) gives the optimal ~elative tax rates on
capital and labour income. Their absolute values depend
upon the revenue requirement. Suppose the share of capital
income in national income is c and that the government's
revenue requirement as a fraction of the national income is
g, then
c t + (1 - c) t = g r w (34)
The value of c will in general depend upon the tax rates
(except in the special case of a Cobb-Douglas production
function) and (32) and (34) are the two implicit equations
determining the values of the two tax rates.
In this section we have concentrated on the distortions
caused by taxes to individual choices. But a very important
effect of capital taxes is their impact on the aggregate level
of savings and it is to this that we now turn.
;-21-
2. Taxation and Aggregate Savings
In the previous section we examined the optimality of
the tax system in terms of its distortion of individual
choices between work and leisure and between present and
future consumption. We saw that in the light of our present
knowledge about the values of the relevant elasticities this
analysis provides little by way of clear-cut recommendations
to' policy-makers. But one of the arguments often employed
by proponents of an expenditure tax is that such a tax would
raise aggregate savings. To explore this issue we must
analyse the optimal tax structure when the level of capital
per head is allowed to vary in the model. In this section
we shall assume that k is' endogenous and that the government
does not have access to policy instruments, such as debt,
which would enable it to attain the golden rule growth path.
At first sight it seems that the case in which k is
variable is considerably more complicated than the fixed-k
case of section 1. But this is not so. From (16) we see
that k enters into the constrained maximisation problem asa
parameter, and so by the envelope theorem the first-order
condition for the fixed-k case is also a first-order
condition for the variable-k case provided it is evaluated at
the optimal value of k. Hence the optimal tax rates in the
general case are given by equation (20) where the value of r
is the optimal value and would be expected to exceed n because
of the failure of each generation to take into account thewelfare of future generations.
-22-
By appealing to the envelope
theorem we may solve the general problem by tackling first the
more restricted case examined above. (6)
In the case when the government can achieve the golden
rule path by the use of other policy instruments, we have
argued that there is no presumption for either an income tax
or an expenditure tax since seemingly plausible estimates of
the parameters could be used to defend either tax system. The
question at issue here is whether allowing for the response
of aggregate savings to taxes shifts the balance of the
argument in favour of an expenditure tax. This is equivalent
to asking if the optimal tax formula in the general case
(equation 20) is more favourable to an expenditure tax than
in the restricted golden-rule case (equation 21). Rearranging
these formulae and denoting the golden-rule regime by
superscript 1 and the variable-k case by superscript 2 we have
t w
1
t 1 = ~ r 1 t
1 - w
t 2
2 w r - n [1 Gt 2] t = ~ 2 + - r 1 t nG r - w







These equations do not determine the tax rates because
the absolute values of the rates will depend also upon the
revenue requirement and the assumptions made about the
production side of the economy. But it can easily be seen
that if there is no presumption for low tax rates on capital
income in the golden rule case this is even more true of the
general case. The following verbal argument illustrates
this. Suppose that the compensated demand elastic~ties (and
hence both p and e) are constants. In regime 2 the output
per man hour is lower than in regime I (because r exceeds n)
and so to meet the fixed revenue requirement the average tax
rate must be higher than in the golden rule case. If the
second regime is to be characterised by a lower ratio of the
tax rate on capital income to the tax rate on labour income,
2 I then the absolute value of t w must exceed that of t w (because
the average value of t 2 and t 2 must be greater than the w r
average value of t w
l and t r
l , and whatever are the appropriate










where a. is positive.
This equation almost certainly implies that t r
2 is greater
that t I r . Even with implausibly high estimates of the
absolute value of 022 the equation could not be satisfied by
a value of t 2 lower than t I except perhaps for very high r rvalues of the capital income tax rate.
-24-
This suggests that
allowing for the endogeneity of aggregate savings does not
in itself provide a strong argument for an expenditure tax.
Of course, it must be stressed that none of these results
support high tax rates on capital income. They merely
emphasize that the structure of the "optimal"tax system is
very sensitive indeed to the precise values of the relevant
elasticities.
It would, however, be wrong to conclude from this
discussion that allowing for the response of aggregate savings
is quantitatively unimportant. To demonstrate this
consider the case in which the individual utility function
satisfies (22), in which case we know that along the
golden rule path the optimal tax rate on capital income is




A not implausible point estimate of the value of
(oL2 - 022) would be unity, in which case the optimal tax rate
on capital income is
=
n
(1 - r) (39)
Even though an expenditure tax would be optimal along
the golden rule path, a substantial tax on capital income
might well be optimal if the government has no independent
I-25-
policy instrument to influence the level of capital
intensity in the economy. For example, a value of the rate
of profit equal to twice tpe growth rate would imply an
optimal tax rate of 50 per cent. Clearly the relationship
between the profit and growth rates at the optimum has a major
bearing on the pattern of optimal tax rates. The value of
r in equations (38) and (39) will be a function of t , and
r
the form of the relationship will depend upon (a) the production
function relating the marginal product of capital to the level
of capital intensity, and (b) the function relating the
aggregate supply of savings to the net of tax rate of return.
The nature of the function relating r to t r is likely to be
complex and it is difficult to make general statements about
the value of t which will prove optimal, except to reiterate
r
the point made above that in a wide range of cases it will
probably exceed the value which would be optimal on the golden
rule growth path.
The main conclusion to emerge from this discussion is
that the values of the optimal tax rates are very sensitive
to the precise values of the various elasticities involved,
and that they depend on two different aspects of savings
behaviour. The first is the individual compensated demand
elasticity of second-period (or "retirement~') consumption
with respect to the interest rate. The second is the
qeneral equilibrium response of aggregate savings to changes in the
net rate of return. The former effect concerns the efficiency
loss of distorting individual choice between present and-26-
future consumption, and the latter concerns the ability of
changes in capital income taxes to drive the economy nearer
to the golden rule path of capital accumulation. These two
aspects of savings behaviour are distinct,but both are important
for the design of the tax system.
One of the virtues of a tax on capital income in the two-period
model is that it helps to raise aggregate saving and hence
pushes the economy nearer to the golden rule growth path. At
first sight this may seem paradoxical, but the explanation
lies in the timing of tax payments. Ignore for the moment
the substitution effects of taxes. Replacing a tax on labour
income by a tax on capital income with the same present discounted
value would have no effect on the individual's bUdget
constraint, and this would not affect his chosen consumption
levels. But the level of private saving would be affected
because the amount which would have been paid in labour income
taxes in period 1 will be saved to meet the tax bill on
capital income in period 2. In this way capital income taxes
produce higher private saving. If the government could vary
its own saving, by borrowing more, then these changes in
private saving would be of no consequence, and this is the case
on the golden rule path. But where the government is unable
to change its borrowing policy and is constrained to operate
only on tax rates, any tax which raises revenue later in an
individual's life rather than earlier will seem attractive.
It is iikely that capital income taxes wi~l have a comparatlve
advantage from thiS point of view even ix the moael were
/-27-
extended to the more realistic case in which individuals
lived for many periods, although the magnitude of the
advantage would probably be less than in the rather extreme
two-period modeL
To illustrate this point consider the example of Cobb
Douglas preferences. On the golden-rule path we know that
the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. But if the
tax system is to be used to encourage aggregate savings this
conclusion no longer holds. In the Cobb-Douglas case aggregate
savings are (from (8) and (26»,
s = (40)
The level of savings is independent of the rate of
interest and hence of the tax rate on capital income. A
change in t r can affect savings only via its effects on t w
and the wage rate. An increase in t r enables t w to be
reduced for a given revenue requirement thus increasing
savings directly. It can easily be checked that in the
Cobb-Douglas case a reduction in t w also results in a higher
capital-labour ratio, implying a higher wage rate which in
turn increases savings. The direct and indirect effects
reinforce each other.
Although this argument for taxes on capital income may
seem somewhat artificial in that we might normally assume
that the government could off-set any change in the timing
of tax payments by changes in its own borrowing policy, it
does have one important implication. This is that in the-28-
context of our model a labour income tax is not equivalent
to an expenditure tax. The incentive effects of the two
taxes are the same but the timing of the tax payments to
which they give rise is not. On the golden rule path this
is irrelevant but away from that path the expenditure tax has
the advantage that tax payments occur later in life than under
the labour income tax. This means that if we impose a tax on
consumption the associated optimal tax rate on capital income
will be less than if we had imposed a tax on labour income.
Consequently, the formulae derived above exaggerate the need
for a capital income tax away from the golden rule because
the tax on labour income could have been imposed instead as
a tax on consumption. Although we argued above that the
value of t~e optimal capital income tax rate was very sensitive
to the discrepancy between rand n, we can now see that it is
sensitive also to the relative timing of tax payments under
an expenditure tax and a capital income tax.
It is time, however, to question the assumption that
government debt policy cannot be used to compensate for
changes in the timing of tax payments. Ignoring debt
policy can lead to absurd results. In the two-period model
it would imply that the optimal tax was a lump-sum tax
collected on an individual's death bed, with his last
action being to sign a cheque for the Inland Revenue for
which he had spent most of his life saving up to pay. This
unsavoury prospect can be disregarded once debt policy is
brought into the picture. For the government may substitute-29-
public saving for private saving by running a surplus and
investing the proceeds at the market interest rate. The
government is now indifferent to the timing of tax payments
and is concerned only to extract a given present discounted
value of revenue from each generation.
government's budget constraint becomes
This means that the
(9' )
The difference between (9) and (9') is that in the
former cash receipts determine the constraint whereas in
the latter the revenue requirement is perceived in present
discounted value terms. The effect of this is that in all
subsequent equations (1 + n) is replaced by (1 + r). It is
a simple matter to check that with this change the optimal
tax rates are given by equation (21) even when r ~ nand
we are not following the golden-rule path. The reason
is that the impact of taxes on aggregate saving can be offset
by an appropriate debt policy, and so moving from one tax
system to another does not move the economy near to the
golden-rule path. Allowing for debt policy means, therefore
that the choice between income and expenditure taxes in
terms of efficiency depends on the values of the elasticities
which appear in (21), and the reader is referred to the
earlier discussion of this.
Our conclusion is that it is difficult to argue strongly
for either an income or an expenditure tax on efficiency grounds-30-
seems to conflict with the views expressed recently by a
number of economists about the large welfare gains which
would result from the abolition of capital income taxes. For
example, Boskin (1978) has claimed that capital income
taxes in the US impose an annual welfare loss amounting
to an astounding 60 billion dollars (which is a present
value close to 1 trillion dollars) • Summers (1978) finds
that the present value of the welfare gains from replacing
capital income taxes by an expenditure tax is at least the
equivalent of 5 years GNP, which in the US is about 2.5
trillion dollars. On a more modest scale Feldstein (1978a)
obtains estimates of the annual gain from replacing capital
income taxes by higher labour income taxes equal to about 1
per cent of GNP, or 50 billion dollars in the us. Whatever
criterion one uses it is clear that these are large figures.
Why is it, therefore, that these studies appear to
conflict wi~h the ambiguous nature of our theoretical results?
Interestingly enough it appears to be the assumptions,
explicit or implicit, which these studies make about labour
supply which provide the key to the differences. Assumptions
about savings behaviour do not seem to be responsible for
themagnitude of the estimated welfare gains. For example,
to calculate the welfare gain from abolishing capital income
taxes Boskiri implicitly uses an estimate of 022 = - 1.533
(see section 5 below), but the main reason for the size of
the gain is that he assumes that the taxes on capital income
are replaced by lump-sum taxes and not, as appears.more
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plausible, by higher taxes on labour income. No weight is
given to the efficiency loss associated with alternative
sources of revenue.·
The differential welfare gain from substituting taxes
on labour income or consumption for capital taxes is considered
by Feldstein and Summers. In Summers' case he assumes that
labour supply is fixed and so again there is no efficiency loss
associated with labour income or expenditure taxation. He
also places great emphasis on the timing of tax payments in
a complete life-cycle model which, as we have seen above,
is an issue that depends critically on the role afforded to
government debt policy.
Feldstein presents a very careful analysis of the
net welfare gain from replacing capital income taxes by a
higher rate of tax on labour income in a two-period model
very similar to that discussed above. The size of the
welfare gain depends on the values of the compensated demand
elasticities shown in equation (21). Feldstein assumes
values of zero for the uncompensated elasticities of
savings with respect to the interest rate and of labour
supply with respect to both the wage rate and the interest
rate. These are not taken as "estimates of the true values
but as simply illustrative values that are likely to under-
state the welfare cost of capital income taxation".
Unfortunately, the particular parameter estimates chosen by
Feldstein happen to imply that an expenditure tax is in fact
optimal as we shall now show. The assumption that the-32-
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to
the wage rate is zero, implies (from (A.l) and (A.5» that
0LL = -w(l - t )dL w dy
If the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with
respect to the interest rate is zero then (from (A.3) and
the symmetry condition on substitution effects)
SL2 = - S2L = C aL
2dy
.




Hence 0LL = 02L and we know from our earlier analysis
that this is the condition that an expenditure tax be optimal.
The assumption of zero uncompensated elasticities is more
powerful than their description of "illustrative values"
might imply. The welfare gain computed by Feldstein is
the gain which would result from adopting an expenditure tax
if that tax were optimal. Again it is instructive to note
that the assumptions which are responsible for this result
concern not the response of savings but labour supply
behaviour. One might be tempted to think that because the
optimal tax system is unlikely to be exactly equal to an
expenditure tax, Feldstein's estimates would provide an
upper bound on the welfare gains of moving from the present
system to an expenditure tax. Even this, however, is untrue.-33-
It may well be that the optimal tax system requires a
subsidy to capital income and in such a case adopting an
expenditure tax might bring large welfare gains even though
it only moves us part of the way toward the optimum.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that Feldstein's estimates
"are likely to understate the welfare cost of capital income
taxation". The correct conclusion would appear to be that
the size of the efficiency losses associated with the present
tax system is very uncertain, but the fact that, as Feldstein
has demonstrated, they may be substantial alerts us to the
need for a much greater understanding of the response of
savings and labour supply to taxation.
!-34-
3. Inflation and Capital Income Tax
In our theoretical model we have assumed that capital
income taxes are imposed only on real interest income; in
essence we assumed either that there was no inflation or that
the tax system was ,fully inde~. But in practice capital income
taxes are levied on nominal capital income, and one of the
most forceful arguments for an expenditure tax is the practical
problems which would be entailed by complete indexation of
the tax system. In this section, therefore, we shall examine
the optimal tax structure given the constraint that taxes on
capital income can be charged only on receipts of nominal
interest income. Since tax authorities have been reluctant
to get embroiled with indexation the choice between expenditure
taxes and unindexed capital income taxes may represent the
realistic alternatives.




First, the price of second-period consumption
1 + TI
(44)
1 + (1 - t r ) (r + TI + TIr)
.
where TI is the rate of inflation and r is again the real
rate of interest before tax. Secondly, the government's
budget constraint changes and if we take the discounted value
form of the constraint (9') it is
;g = t
w
wL + hi c2 t r (r. + .'IT + 'lTr)
(1 + 'IT) (1 + r)
-35-
(45)
It can easily be verified that with these changes the
optimal tax rates are .given by a modified version of (21) in
which the real interest rate is replaced by the nominal
interest rate
r
l = r + 'IT + 'lTr (46)
Intuitively it is clear why this is the case because the
base of the capital income tax is the nominal interest rate and
not the real rate of interest. If the government uses debt
policy to determine the real rate of interest, and hence the
optimal level of capital accumulation, the real rate of
7 .
interest can be regarded as exogenous.
With this assumption it is easy to show that the optimal
tax rate on nominal (unindexed) capital income is such as to
have no effect on real behaviour nor on the optimal tax rate on
labour income. For this to be so we would require







From (46) this gives
t ' r
r (1 + 'IT)J
+ 'IT + 'lTr
(48)-36-
This value of t ' implies that individual behaviour is
r
unaltered because h = h' and it also satisfies the government's
budget constraint. The introduction of inflation income into
the model means that the optimal tax rate on capital income is
multiplied by the factor shown in (48). It is clear that the
tax rate should be lower in the presence of inflation. For
example, if as above we take the real rate of interest over a
generation to be unity then with a rate of inflation equal to the
rate of interest the optimal tax rate is reduced to two-thirds
of its previous value. The failure to index the taxation of
capital income makes a significant difference to the relative
claims of an income tax and an expenditure tax. This brings
us back to one of the arguments deployed by the Meade Committee
in favour of an expenditure tax, namely that the practical
difficulties of indexing capital income taxation are as large,
if not larger as the transitional problems involved in shifting ,
to an expenditure tax. The theoretical arguments of this secion
certainly support the contention that the optimal tax rate on
capital income is very sensitive to the feasibility of indexation.
;-37-
4. Variations on the Basic Model
In this section we discuss the effects of relaxing some of
the crucial assumptions of the simple two-period model analysed
above. The most important of these is that labour is supplied
only in the first period which implies that an individual's
initial wealth is independent of interest rates. In practice,
his endowment consists of a future stream of potential receipts
and the present value of this stream will depend upon the interest
rate. For many people the most significant component of the
stream is future labour income. Once we allow the value of
wealth, especially future earnings, to depend on the interest
rate, changes in interest rate have two effects on savings. The
first is the direct effect analysed above and the second is an
indirect effect via changes in wealth. An increase in the
interest rate will reduce the present value of wealth, thus
lowering present consumption and stimulating savings. The
interest elasticity of savings with respect to the interest rate
may be much higher than is suggested by the two-period model.
This point was first made by Hall (1968) and later stressed
by Summers (1978) who, on the basis of numerical simulations,
concluded that the size of the interest elasticity of savings
was dominated by the wealth effect and that the elasticity of
substitution between present and future consumption was much
less important.
It is possible to illustrate this phenomenon by
extending our model to include an endowment in period 2. To
simplify matters we will assume that each individual receives-38-
a fixed endowment in period 2 of value e, (this is sufficient
to make the point and avoids the complications of modelling
variable labour supply in period 2).
constraint is now given by
The individual budget
= w(l - t )L + he w
(49 )
We may also write the budget constraint as
= w (1 - t ) L
w (50)
where S is the value of personal savings per worker.
form of the constraint applies to both the original and
This
amended forms of the model. The government budget constraint
(in present discounted value terms) may also be written as
g = t wL +
w
r t r .S
1 + r
(51)
If we now maximise steady-state utility per capita
subject to this budget constraint expressed in terms of
savings rather than second-period consumption, then we obtain
suitably modified versions of the first-order conditions
(17) and (18). Together with the appropriate Slutsky
equations, these conditions enable us to derive the optimal
tax rates in terms of compensated savings elasticities. It
is straightforward to .show that the relationship between the
optimal tax rates is given by
;r t




where aSL = compensated elasticity of savings w.r.t. the wage rate
aLS = compensated elasticity of labour supply w.r.t. the
price of second-period consumption h
aSS = compensated elasticity of savings w.r.t. the price
h
This formula holds irrespective of the size of any
second-period endowment.
In the case analysed in section 1 in which there was
no second-period endowment, savings were a constant multiple of
second-period consumption which implies that
(53)
The own price elasticities are related as
S = hC2
as haC2
ah = C2 + ah
Multiplying both sides by hiS we have
(54)
(55)-40-
The elasticity of savings with respect to the price h
is equal to the elasticity of second-period consumption plus
unity. This is because savings represent current expenditure
on future consump~ion (see Feldstein 1978 b). It is easy to
see that substituting (53) and (55) into (52) yields equation
(21), which is the condition we derived above for the case of
a zero second-period endowment. But we may now extend the
model to allow for a positive endowment in period 2 equal to
e. In this case we have, as before, that aLS = aL2 , but
the savings elasticities are now changed.
S = h(C2 - e)









C - e 2
> 1.
Similarly, it can be shown that
/
(58)-41-
In other words, allowing for a second-period endowment
(a very simple way of introducing more realistic life-cycle
considerations into the model) means that the elasticities of
second-period consumption which appear in the formula for the




This reduces to (21) when a equals unity, but in general
a will exceed unity and could be large if, as one might expect
in a complete life-cycle model, most future consumption were
financed from future earnings.
The significance of this extension may be illustrated by
looking again at two of the examples we examined in section 1.
Consider, first, the case where utility functions are Cobb-
Douglas. In the basic model the assumption of Cobb-Douglas
utility functions implies that the optimal tax is an
expenditure tax with t = 0 (see above) r Substituting from
(28)-(31) for the values of the compensated elasticities in
the Cobb-Douglas case, we see that in the extended model the
optimal tax rates are given by
1 + r
r
t w (a - 1)a2 (1 - a 2)
1 - t w [al a 2 (a ~ 1) + a(l - a l - a 2)]
(60)-42-
It is clear from this expression that the optimal tax
on capital income is in fact a sUbSidy~ As ex -+- 1 the
optimal tax system tends to the expenditure tax, but in
general higher values of ex will imply a capital subsidy the
size of which will depend on parameter values. Suppose we
take the case where ex = 3 (the second-period endowment is
equal to two-thirds of desired second-period consumption),
1, t 1 1 1 then t -.265. The optimal r = w = 3' a l = 3' a2 = 4' = r
tax system consists of a 26.5 per cent subsidy to capital income.
With t w
high as
1 = 2 the optimal subsidy to capital income is as
53 per cent.
The second example to consider is that in which a
comprehensive income tax was optimal in the basic model. In
that example the cross-elasticities were assumed to be zero,
and the remaining parameter values were 0LL = 0.4, 022 = -1.2,
r = 1, t w =~. When ex = 1 t r = i and the optimal tax system
is a comprehensive income tax. Again, higher values of ex lead
to lower tax rates on capital income. With a value for ex of
3, the optimal tax rate on capital income is only 11 per cent.
As a final illustration of the need to consider an
extended life-cycle model, consider the case when savings are
very small. As savings tend to zero in this model, the value
of ex tends to infinity. In the limit the optimal tax rates
are given by
t r t °22 w r
= (61)
1 - t 1 + r °2L w-43--44-
manner one may be tempted to make simplifying assumptions about
individual utility functions, such as separability between
consumption and leisure or between consumption levels over
time. Unfortunately, as we have seen, assumptions such as
these have very strong implications for the design of the
tax system. Secondly, the presence of uncertainty has been
used by some as an argument for the provision of social
security (state pensions). For example, Diamond (1977) in
an interesting (and non-technical) discussion of the rationale
for social security points to the absence of securities offering
riskless real rates of return and to the difficulty of
insuring in the market againathe effects of unemployment or
ill health on retirement. These are offered as possible
justifications for a compulsory social security scheme.
.Leaving to one side the merits of the argument, we shall
simply draw attention to the implications of the existence of
social security for the tax system. In the model explored
above we may interpret the second-period endowment e as an
untaxed pension with the payments financed out of general tax
revenues. As shown above, the existence of the pension scheme
increases the individual elasticity of savings with respect to
the interest rate, and lowers the optimal tax rate on capital
income. Unfunded pension schemes reinforce any case for an
expenditure tax and against an income tax.
This leads us into the remaini~g set of questions,
which are those concerning the government. It is clear that
one of the roles of a state pension scheme is redistribution
both within and between generations. We have examined the45-
inter-generational distribution when considering the impact
of taxation on the aggregate level of savings, but the
assumption of identical individuals ruled out any role for
intra-generational distribution. The source of differences
in endowments in our model is two-fold. First, potential
wages may vary among individuals because of differing "abilities";
in a model without savings this formulation is the optimal
income tax problem examined by Mirrlees(197l) and Wesson
(1972). Secondly, the value of future labour earnings may
vary because of differences in the opportunity cost of capital
facing individuals. Imperfections in the capital market,
such as constraints on borrowing or lending, will affect the
value of an individual's endowment. In the absence of an
explicit model it is difficult to assess the extent to which
these considerations would influence the choice of the tax
base as opposed to the optimal rate structure. Ordover and
Phelps (1979) have shown that allowing for differences in
abilities or wage rates does not alter the condition for
optimality of the expenditure tax, which remains that each
individual's utility function must satisfy (22). Imper-
fections in the capital market are a more difficult matter,
and require further research.
The final point is that in practice governments are
only too aware of the fact that tax reform must start from
the system we have today. The transition from today's
initial position to the desired long-run state is important'
from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. An
overnight switch from an income tax to an expenditure tax
;-46-
would result in a windfall loss for the generation which had
just retired. Not only is this undesirable in principle,
but the incentives to conceal wealth held on the changeover
date make such a transition infeasible. A gradual transition
is necessary on practical grounds (see the lengthy discussion
on transitional arrangements in the Meade Report), and would
be designed so as to avoid significant windfall gains and
losses. To achieve this it would be necessary to keep
constant the present value of the tax liabilities of those
alive at the start of the transition. This requires adjustments
in government borrowing to compensate for changes in the timing
of tax payments. It would be a mistake not to use debt policy
as an instrument to aid a smooth transition. And if debt
policy is an important part of the transition to a new state,
it seems misplaced to rule it out in the long-run also. This
provides support for the view that the appropriate formulation
of the government's bUdget constraint is in terms of the present
discounted value of revenue received from each generation.-47-
5. Empirical Evidence on Savings and Rates of Return
Since a consumption function is an essential ingredient
of all large econometric models, we might expect to find
numerous empirical studies of the relationship between savings
and interest rates. In fact, there are remarkably few
econometric investigations of the effects of relative prices
on the intertemporal allocation of consumption, and even
fewer which have used the appropriate explanatory variables.
The empirical study which is closest to the theoretical
model we have explored is that of Boskin and Lau (1978).
They estimate a two-period life cycle model in which
individuals choose consumption levels in the working and
retirement stages of life, and labour supply before retirement
which occurs at a fixed date. Individuals have identical
preferences represented by an indirect utility function
(equivalent to the function V used above) which is assumed to
be of the homogeneous translog form. This gives the following
demand functions for the three goods, first-period consumption,




L B.. log p. + zJ.'
J.J J
j=l
i = 1...3 (62 )
where x. = demand for good i
J.
Pi = normalised price of good i, i.e. the price divided
by exogenous income
Zl = vector of characteristics such as age, sex and life
expectancy of consumer.-48-
A good explanation of the derivation of this demand system
(and other functional forms for the indirect utility function) is
contained in Berndt, Darrough and Diewert (1977). They show
that the demand system in (62) is linear in the parameters only
because of the assumption that preferences are homothetic.
This is a strong assumption because it implies that all income
elasticities are unity. It also imposes the following














= 8.. for each (63)
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i and j
Although the specification of (62) is derived from a
model of individual household behaviour, Boskin and Lau
estimate the model on aggregate time-series data for the US
over the period 1929-69. For a discussion of aggregation in
models such as this the reader is referred to Berndt, Darrough
and Diewert (1977). Boskin and Lau report estimates of the
uncompensated elasticities whereas our formulae for optimal tax
rates are derived in terms of compensated elasticities. But
in the special case of homothetic preferences it can be shown
from equation (19) and the Slutsky equations (Al)-(A4) that the
followinq formula holds if we replace the compensated
elasticities cr by the corresponding uncompensated elasticities
n , and denote the average propensity to save by s.
(64)
/-49-
Using single-equation methods Boskin and Lau obtain the








n22 = -1. 49
(-15.71)
These estimates have the striking implication that the
optimal tax system comprises a substantial subsidy to capital
income. We have (taking s in the two-period case as 0.4)
t 1 + r
t - (·19 ) w (65) = r 1 t w - r
The length of the period is assumed by Boskin and Lau to
be 20 years. If we assume a value for the
real rate of return of 3 per cent per annum, a revenue
requirement of 25 per cent of national income,
and that the share of capital income is 25%, the optimal tax
rates are
t = w
t r = -. 216
The optimal tax system is a substantial subsidy to
capital income. Moreover, the estimates (together with
the assumptions about the rate of return and share of
capital income) imply that the maximum revenue which the optimal-50-
tax system could generate is only 34% of national income.
This occurs with a tax rate on labour income of 57.5%.
Substituting (65) into (34) produces a non linear
relationship between the revenue raised as a proportion of
national income and the optimal tax rate on earned income.
This could be interpreted as an optimal tax version of the
so called "Laffer" curve relating tax revenue to the rate
of tax. We have allowed explicitly for the optimal tax
structure in order to find the reduced form solution for
the relationship between revenue and tax rates.
The virtue of the Boskin and Lau study is that it
shows clearly how crucial are the estimates of the cross-
elasticities which are usually ignored in studies that focus
on the dependence of labour supply o~the wage rate and of
savings on the interest rate. An earlier study of the life
cycle model by Diewert (1974) employed an indirect utility
function defined over the prices of consumption, leisure,
and money for each of thirty periods. The model was estimated
on aggregate annual US data over the period 1946-65. In
order to limit the number of parameters to be estimated,
Diewert imposed some a priori restrictions, including the
assumption that the elasticity of future consumption with
respect to the wage rate (a2L) was zero. Despite this
restriction, his estimates also imply that a subsidy. to
capital income would be optimal.
A major difficulty with these models is the measurement
of the price of future consumption, and this has emerged-51-
recently as a key issue in the estimation of conventional
consumption functions incorporating interest rates. There
are two related issues here. The first is that it is clear
that the relevant interest rate is the real net of tax rate of
return. But of the few studies which have included interest
rates, most have used nominal interest rates and ignored
tax rates. This procedure leads to downward bias in the
estimated interest elasticity of savings (Feldstein 1970).
A careful treatment of tax rates by Wright (1969) led to
estimates of the interest elasticity of savings in the
range 0.18 to 0.27. For empirical work it is necessary to
decide on which of a whole array of interest rates to use,
and to estimate the average marginal tax rates on income from
capital. We shall simply mention these questions and pass
on.
The second issue which arises in measuring the rate of
return is that it should be net of the expected rate of
inflation. If the time horizon is of the order of twenty
years (between the first and second periods of the stylised
life cycle) then we need to specify a model for the formation
of expectations over a long period. The appropriate way to
do this is at the heart of the debate over the size of the
interest elasticity of savings between Boskin (1978) and
Howrey and Hyrnans (1978).
Boskin's aim was to estimate the interest elasticity of
savings using a properly specified rneasure of the rate of
return, net of both taxes and expected inflation. He used-52-
aggregate annual US data for the period 1929-69 and
experimented with a variety of specifications and definitions
of the variables. The preferred equation was estimated using
instrumental variables to allow for simultaneous equations
bias, and the sample period for this equation was 1929-66
excluding the war years 1941-6. This yielded the following
estimated equation (standard errors in parentheses)




















where Ct = real per capita consumption
Yt = real per capita private disposable income
W t = real per capita wealth
Ut = unemployment rate
Rt = real post-tax interest rate
7ft = expected rate of inflation
This equation implies a significant interest elasticity
of savings of about 0.4 evaluated at the mean values of the
variables. In fact the total elasticity of savings is higher
than this because the value of 0.4 is computed ignoring any
effect of interest rate changes on wealth. We shall not
discuss the rationale of the specification of a consumption
function of the type shown in (66) but concentrate on the
estimate of the interest rate coefficient.
.I
The interest-53-
rate which Boskin uses is a post-tax nominal rate minus the
expected inflation rate. This latter variable was "estimated
from an adaptive expectations model of price expectations,..
~runcated after 8 years, with varying speeds of adjustment (p.Sll).
It is clear that this is not the only possible specification, and
Howrey and Hymans (1978) have challenged Boskin's results by
claiming that the significance of the interest rate coefficient
is very sensitive to the particular measure of the expected
rate of inflation and to the sample period. For example,
by omitting a single year (1934) they find that using Boskin's
original data the interest rate coefficient becomes insignificant.
This is an important point, and suggests that there may
be insufficient information contained in annual observations to
enable us to identify at all precisely the size of the
savings elasticity. Unfortunately, Howrey and Hymans' own
estimates are flawed by their. use of single-equation estimation
methods and a very narrow definition of savings. They prefer
a concept of "loanable-funds" saving to the more conventional
national income accounting definition thus excluding saving
in pension funds, owner-occupied housing and other durables.
The resulting definition of saving covers only 14 per cent
of private saving amounting in 1975 to 36.0 billion dollars
out of a total figure for gross private saving of 259.4
billion dollars. On this basis Howrey and Hymans find an
insignificant interest elasticity of savings.
Leaving aside the econometric difficulties of estimating
the savings elasticity, we can see that Boskin is right to
emphasise that even small values ~or the interest elasticity
;-54-
of savings imply large values for the elasticity of
retirement consumption with respect to its own price. To
relate estimates obtained from annual data to the two-
period theoretical model we shall redefine the price of second-
period consumption to allow for continuous compounding
h = -rT e (67)
where r is the net of tax real interest rate per
annum and T is the length of time between the periods
ah ar = -hT




osr = - rT + 02r (70)
But 0 =- rT 0 2r 22
Using Boskin's average estimate of0.4 for 0 I and sr
(71)
(72) .
values of 3 per cent for the interest rate and 25 years for
the period, we obtain a point estimate of -1.533 for 022•
Even if 0sr = 0 then 022 = -1, and it is evident that the-55-
efficiency arguments for or against an expenditure tax are
only marginally affected by whether the interest elasticity
of savings is zero or 0.4.-56-
6. Conclusions
The main contention of the Meade RepJrt was that there
was probably little to choose between an expenditure tax
and a comprehensive income tax on efficiency grounds, and
that the telling argument for an expenditure tax was that it
represented the only practicable alternative to the present
mess which has arisen, at least partly,from an unworkable
distinction between capital and income. To bolster this
argument the Meade Committee drew attention to the enormous
range of effective tax rates on capital income according to
the type of asset and financial medium through which savings
are channelled. This emphasis on the "portfolio" nature of
saving and its tax treatment contrasts with the simple model
of life-cycle saving which we have examined above. In one
sense, our analysis confirms the Meade Reportis judgment
that on conventional efficiency grounds it is difficult to
argue strongly for an expenditure tax. Yet, the analysis
shows also that the efficiency losses of the present system
may be large. Perhaps the most striking result is that the
"optimal" tax system is very sensitive to the characterisation
of the life cycle in our model and much less so to the precise
value of the interest elasticity of savings. The strongest
arguments for an expenditure tax, within the framework of our
model, are the failure to index the income tax base for
inflation and the existence of unfunded pension schemes.
Academic debate over the size of a single elasticity, the
interest elasticity of savings, is only a part, and a small
/-57-
part at that of the set of considerations relevant to the
very important practical problem of tax reform.REFERENCES
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/FOOTNOTES
1. The model is based on Atkinson and Sandmo (1979), but
the results and their derivation are somewhat different.
2. Those who prefer to work with the direct utility function
will find that the mathematics is only slightly more
cumbersome.
3. It can be shown that the second-order conditions for an
optimum are satisfied if the revenue from each tax is an
increasing function of the tax rate.
4. The "only if" follows provided all elasticities are finite.
5. It should be noted that (23) is not equivalent to the
condition that the utility function be weakly separable
into labour supply and some function of the consumption
levels in the two periods except when the function of
consumption levels is homothetic; see Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) and Auerbach (1979).
6. This enables us to obtain a result and proof both of which
appear to be much simpler than those in the literature.
The envelope theorem is discussed in, for example, Dixit
(1976).
7. We are assuming here that the incentive to invest depends
only on the real rate of interest which will not be true
if the corporate tax system is unindexed.
8. To be strictly accurate equation (60) shows that t w and
t have opposi te signs. But from _( 34) it can be shown
r
that when the tax rates have opposite signs it is the
tax on labour income which is positive provided that the
share of capital income is less than b/(l+b) where b is the
/ratio of the absolute magnitudes of t w to t r • This
condition is-satisfied in all of our examples and in
all plausible cases.
;. Appendix
The expression for the optimal relative tax rates on
wages and interest income is derived by substituting the Slutsky
equations into equation (20). Denoting y by income and Sij for
the substitution terms,we have the Slutsky equations
. ·aL aL
+ sLL) (AI) at = -w(L-
w ay
ae aC2 2
+ S2L) (A2 ) at = -w(L--
w ay
aL 2 c aL +SL2) (A3) at = rh (-
r -2ay
aC2 2 aC2 +522) (A4 ) at = rh (- c2ay r
The compensated elasticities, 0 •• , are defined by
~J
(1 - tw)w 5LL
°LL = (A5) L
(1- tw)w S2L





h 5 22 (AB) ° 22 =
c2
:'We now substitute from (AI) to (A4) for the partial
derivatives in (19)
The income effects cancel out, and we may replace the
substitution terms by the elasticities from (AS) to (AB)













After re-arranging this becomes equation (20) of the text.